Motor Vehicle Crimes

Massachusetts Involuntary Manslaughter Case Highlights Double Jeopardy Risks in Criminal Sentencing

Published on: July 25, 2025 | by Patrick J. Murphy, Esq.

Multiple charges often follow when someone is accused of a serious offense involving a fatal crash, each carrying its own penalties. However, the law does not allow prosecutors to stack overlapping charges for the same act. A recent decision from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court clarifies how courts must avoid imposing multiple punishments when offenses stem from the same event.

In a case decided in May 2025, the court considered whether a person convicted of involuntary manslaughter in connection with a fatal highway crash could also be punished for motor vehicle homicide and operating to endanger. The court ruled that the lower court erred by convicting the accused on all three counts, finding that the additional charges duplicated the involuntary manslaughter conviction. Those two lesser charges were vacated, while the manslaughter conviction and a separate conviction for driving without insurance were upheld.

This case is important for anyone facing multiple charges from a single incident. Prosecutors may file every possible charge during the early stages of a case, but not all of them can result in separate punishments. If you are charged with overlapping offenses, you may have legal grounds to challenge the sentence or the charges themselves.

U.S. Supreme Court Issues Important Opinion Affecting Many Massachusetts Traffic Stops

Published on: April 27, 2020 | by Patrick J. Murphy, Esq.

Earlier this month, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an opinion that will have a significant impact on many Massachusetts criminal law cases. The opinion, Kansas v. Glover, presented the court with the question: whether a police officer can reasonably assume that the person who is operating a motor vehicle is that vehicle’s registered owner. The Court answered the question in the affirmative. The case is important because, under the Court’s new ruling, police officers can now pull over a vehicle for no reason other than the owner of that vehicle has an outstanding warrant.

The case arose when a deputy ran the license plate of a pick-up truck to find out that the registered owner’s driver’s license had been revoked. The deputy assumed that the person who was driving the car was the registered owner, and pulled over the vehicle. The deputy was correct, and the defendant was cited for driving on a revoked license.

The defendant argued that the deputy lacked reasonable suspicion to pull him over. Specifically, the defendant claimed that the deputy was relying on a “hunch” when he assumed that the driver of a vehicle was also the vehicle’s registered owner. The defendant also argued that the fact that the registered owner’s license was revoked decreased the likelihood that the driver of the vehicle was the registered owner.

Massachusetts Appellate Court Finds “Open Container” Violation Is Not a Criminal Offense

Published on: March 19, 2020 | by Patrick J. Murphy, Esq.

Earlier this month, the Supreme Judicial Court issued a written opinion in a case involving a Massachusetts OUI arrest in which the defendant also had an open container of alcohol in the car. The case required the court to determine if the state’s prohibition on driving with an open container of alcohol constituted a criminal offense or if it was considered correctly a civil motor vehicle infraction. Ultimately, the court found that the open container statute was an “automobile law violation,” making it a civil motor vehicle infraction.

According to the court’s opinion, police pulled the defendant over under suspicion of driving under the influence. When police approached the defendant’s vehicle, they saw an open container of alcohol. Police charged the defendant with OUI and possessing an open container of alcohol in a motor vehicle. At trial, the jury found the defendant not guilty of OUI but guilty of the open container violation. The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the open container violation was not a criminal offense, and that it should have been resolved through a ticket.

The fundamental question posed to the court was whether the open container statute defined a criminal offense or a traffic violation. The court’s framework for answering the question was fairly sophisticated. First, the court noted that a “civil motor vehicle infraction” is one involving an “automobile law violation” that cannot result in imprisonment. The court then acknowledged that the open container statute did not provide for the possibility of imprisonment. Thus, the court’s next step was to determine if an open container violation was properly considered an “automobile law violation.”

Can Massachusetts Police Officers Assume a Driver Is the Vehicle’s Owner When Deciding Whether to Pull Someone Over?

Published on: December 26, 2019 | by Patrick J. Murphy, Esq.

Police officers make assumptions every single day. For example, a police officer may observe a motorist drift over the center line once or twice and assume that the driver is under the influence of drugs or alcohol. In this example, the officer relies on the assumption that a driver is intoxicated because they are not able to maintain a single lane of travel.

Massachusetts criminal law allows police officers to make certain assumptions, within reason. Recently, the United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments in a case involving whether police officers can assume that the driver of a vehicle is also the owner of the vehicle. The case is important for Boston criminal defense lawyers and their clients to understand because, if the court sides with the prosecution, police officers across the country can make similar assumptions when deciding whether to pull over a vehicle.

The case arose after a police officer ran the tags on a pick-up truck and noticed that the owner of the truck had a suspended license. Assuming that the driver of the vehicle was the vehicle’s owner, the officer initiated a traffic stop. During the stop, the officer confirmed that the defendant owned the vehicle and then issued him a citation.

Massachusetts Court Suppresses Defendant’s Statement Indicating That He Knew Car Was Stolen

Published on: March 4, 2019 | by Patrick J. Murphy, Esq.

Last month, a state appellate court issued a written opinion in a Massachusetts car theft case discussing whether the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant. Ultimately, the court concluded that the officers had probable cause to believe that the car was stolen and that the defendant was in possession of the car, but not that the defendant knew the car was stolen. Thus, the court suppressed the post-arrest statements made by the defendant, because his arrest was illegal.

The Facts of the Case

According to the court’s opinion, the defendant was seen leaning next to a car. As police drove by, they ran the car’s plates and determined that the vehicle was stolen. The police observed the defendant open the car door, throw something in, and then close the door. The defendant eventually got into the car through the passenger’s side door and sat down in the front passenger seat. There was no one else in the car.

Based on their observations, the police arrested the defendant. After his arrest, the defendant admitted to knowing that the car was stolen. The defendant was charged with receipt of stolen property.

Massachusetts Court Explains the Difference Between “Attempted” and “Threatened” Battery

Published on: September 1, 2018 | by Patrick J. Murphy, Esq.

In a recent Massachusetts criminal law appellate opinion, a state court discussed the difference between the two types of battery, attempted and threatened, and whether the latter requires a finding that the victims were aware of the defendant’s conduct. Ultimately, the court concluded that a threatened battery does require that the victim be aware of the defendant’s conduct, and reversed two of the defendant’s four convictions on that theory.

The Facts of the Case

The defendant was charged with four counts of assault for allegedly using his vehicle to intentionally crash into another vehicle containing his ex-girlfriend, her new boyfriend, and two other passengers.

The two rear-seat passengers testified that they got in the car, everything seemed fine, and then the next thing they knew they had been hit by another vehicle. They both believed they had been struck by a drunk driver. The two front seat passengers saw the defendant’s car approaching, although only one of them was able to make out the defendant as the driver.

Criminal Liability for Hit and Run in Massachusetts

Published on: September 12, 2016 | by Patrick J. Murphy, Esq.

In Commonwealth v. Anderson, a Massachusetts appellate court considered a criminal hit and run case. The defendant was charged with leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident after causing personal injury and property damage, as well as reckless operation of a motor vehicle.

The case arose after 2:00 a.m., when police officers and firefighters responded to a car accident. A Ford Mustang had crashed through the wall of a house, such that it was partially inside and partially outside. A woman and her boyfriend occupied the house. The boyfriend was injured and had to go to the hospital. By the time the police arrived, nobody was inside the Ford Mustang, and nobody identified himself as the driver. The key was left in the ignition, and the glass and locks were intact. The defendant was the registered owner.

When police tried to reach the defendant, they got his parents. Later, the defendant came to the police station and talked to one of the officers who’d responded to the scene. He told the officer that he’d lost control of the Mustang, hit the house, and in a panic, left for a friend’s house. Other than this confession, nobody came forward to identify him.

Motor Vehicle Homicide in Massachusetts

Published on: June 15, 2015 | by Patrick J. Murphy, Esq.

Under G. L. c. 90, § 24G(b), somebody who operates a car or other vehicle recklessly or negligently and endangers the lives of others, and thereby causes another’s death, can be convicted of homicide by a motor vehicle. The punishment is imprisonment in jail or a house of correction for a minimum of 30 days and a maximum of 2 1/2 years, or a fine of $300-3,000, or both of these.

In Commonwealth v. Gallien, the defendant was convicted of motor vehicle homicide by negligent operation. The evidence showed the defendant didn’t stop the tow truck he was driving, resulting in a crash with a Honda Civic stopped at a red light. The collision killed a passenger in the rear-seat of the Honda.

The judge precluded the defendant from presenting evidence about modifications made to the Honda. The court explained that in criminal cases, a victim’s contributory negligence, even if it is a big part of the cause of a homicide, doesn’t excuse the defendant for also causing the victim’s death. To the extent that the defense’s goal was to show the victim was also negligent, excluding the evidence was proper. On appeal, however, the defendant argued that the modifications evidence should have been admissible not to show the victim’s negligence, but to show that the driver’s actions were an intervening or superseding cause of the victim’s death. The driver was a third party, not the victim.
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Duplicative OUI Charges in Massachusetts

Published on: July 15, 2014 | by Patrick J. Murphy, Esq.

If you hurt someone while drunk driving in Massachusetts, you may be charged with multiple counts, some of which may seem quite similar. In a recent case, a Massachusetts defendant was convicted of (1) drunk driving (operating under the influence or OUI), (2) drunk driving that caused a serious bodily injury, (3) driving on a suspended license, (4) manslaughter by motor vehicle, and (5) motor vehicle homicide. The case arose because the defendant was driving drunk on the wrong side of an access road and crashed into a Saturn. A 17-year-old passenger in the Saturn was killed and the driver seriously injured.

A state police trooper later testified that when the crash happened, the defendant was driving at 55 mph in a 25-mph zone, and the defendant didn’t try to avoid the crash. The defendant claimed he had drunk two 16-oz. mojitos and a vodka-Red Bull drink before the crash happened. The trooper also noted the defendant’s slurred speech, glassy eyes, unsteadiness, and failure to pass a sobriety test. The trooper arrested the defendant.

During the booking process, blood ran from the defendant’s ear, and he asked for medical assistance. Paramedics examined him. He agreed to a breathalyzer test with two measurements, and his blood alcohol level measured at .17 and .18. Next, he was taken to the hospital, where his blood alcohol level was measured at .15.
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Miranda Rights in a Massachusetts Investigatory Stop

Published on: March 19, 2014 | by Patrick J. Murphy, Esq.

Miranda rights are frequently misunderstood. When police officers take a suspect into custody intending to conduct an interrogation, they must advise the suspect of his (1) right to remain silent, (2) that what he says can be used against him/her, (3) right to an attorney and that one will be provided at no charge if he can’t afford one. However, Miranda rights need not be given before asking questions at a crime scene, before a suspect volunteers statements, questioning for fact-finding purpose and questioning someone during an investigatory stop.

In a recent case that is not binding precedent, a defendant appealed the jury’s finding he was guilty of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, negligent operation of a motor vehicle and assault. He appealed on the grounds that statements he made at the time of his arrest should have been suppressed.

The appellate court explained that a jury could have found facts that supported the conviction. In the version the jury believed, a police officer was sent to a car crash at 2:00 a.m. and found the car near a broken telephone pole on a lawn with heavy tire marks. The defendant was at the scene, smelling of alcohol and slurred his speech.
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